Program > Papers by author > Plantin Guillaume

Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence
Jean Barthelémy  1, *, @  , Eric Mengus  2, @  , Guillaume Plantin  3, @  
1 : Banque de France
Banque de France
2 : HEC Paris
GROUPE HEC
3 : Département d\'économie, Sciences Po
Sciences Po
* : Corresponding author

This paper studies how private demand for public liquidity affects the independence of a central bank vis-à-vis the fiscal authority. Whereas supplying liquidity to the private sector creates degrees of freedom for both fiscal and monetary authorities, we show that the authority that is most able to attract private liquidity demand can ultimately impose its views to the other. 

Subject : : paper
Topics : C3 - Fiscal and monetary policies
Keywords : Central bank independence ; monetary and fiscal interactions
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